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Duggan: CACI Premier Technology, Inc. v. Rhodes
CA CI PREMIER TECHNOLOGY, INC. V. RHODES

Beginning in April 2004, the United States military came under intense
public scrutiny following the publication of shocking photographic evidence of
prisoner abuse at the United States' military-controlled Abu Ghraib Prison (now
Baghdad Central Prison) in Iraq.1 The controversy surrounding the abuses at Abu
Ghraib intensified a larger national debate about the conduct of the war in Iraq.2
A point of particular contention was the growing role of private contractors in
ongoing military operations.3

In August 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that Randi Rhodes, a talk show host on Air America Radio, could not be
held liable for defamation for comments she made criticizing CACI Premier
Technology, Inc. (CACI), one of the private military contractors that supplied
civilian interrogators to the Abu Ghraib Prison.4 Basing its decision primarily on5
the "actual malice" standard first announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's order granting Rhodes's motion
6
for summary judgment.
Rhodes, admittedly a "shrill, screeching, .
hectoring, [and] cocksure"
host,7 used her program on Air America as a platform to accuse various private

1. See, e.g., Editorial, Abuses at Abu Ghraib, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at A14 ("To
imagine the outrage the incident has provoked, Americans need only imagine how they would feel
if they saw pictures of American soldiers being treated in a similar way."); Sewell Chan & Jackie
Spinner, Allegations ofAbuse Lead to Shakeup at IraqiPrison, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2004, at A24
("The documents add to growing accusations of improper prisoner treatment at Abu Ghraib, which
was Iraq's largest and most notorious prison during the rule of ousted president Saddam Hussein.");
Editorial, The Nightmare at Abu Ghraib, N.Y. TiMES, May 3, 2004, at A22 ("The American
military made a strange and ill-starred decision when it chose to incarcerate Iraqis in Abu Ghraib,
the prison that had become a byword for torture under Saddam Hussein and a symbol of everything
the invasion of Iraq was supposed to end."); Roland Watson et al., Scandal over Humiliation of
Iraqi Prisoners, TIMES (London), Apr. 30, 2004, at 1 ("[P]hotographs that show US troops
humiliating and trying to 'break' Iraqi prisoners [have] shocked America .... ).
2.
See, e.g., Mark Jurkowitz, A War of Images, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2004, at CI
("Several analysts say that the flood of horrific pictures-whether featuring Americans, insurgents,
or terrorists as the perpetrators of evil deeds-will probably increase overall anxiety and concern
about the situation in Iraq."); James Risen, Command ErrorsAided Iraq Abuse, Army Has Found,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2004, at Al ("The widening prison-abuse scandal in Iraq, which has stirred
anger in the Arab world just as the Marines have tried to defuse a bloody confrontation in Falluja,
holds the potential to damage efforts by American officials to meet a June 30 deadline to transfer
limited self-rule to the Iraqi people.").
3.
See, e.g., Editorial, A Privatized War, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7, 2004, at A22 ("The
deeper issue with civilian contractors in a situation like the Abu Ghraib prison is overall
accountability-how private employees fit into the chain of command."); Paul Krugman, Op-Ed.,
Battlefield of Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A29 ("It's one thing to have civilians drive
trucks and serve food; it's quite different to employ them as personal bodyguards to U.S. officials,
as guards for U.S. government installations and-the latest revelation-as interrogators in Iraqi
prisons.").
4.
CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v. Rhodes, 536 F.3d 280, 284 (4th Cir. 2008).
5.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
6.
CACI, 536 F.3d at 304.
7.
Id. at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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contractors of committing or colluding in a multitude of heinous crimes. 8 CACI
was one of several
military contractor firms that Rhodes accused by name on her
9
radio program.
CACI sued Rhodes and Air America for defamation under Virginia law in a
diversity action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. 10 CACI based its suit on several of Rhodes's statements that she made
on air from August 10-26, 2005.11 These statements accused CACI and its
12
employees of, inter alia, "misrepresent[ing] their authority to soldiers,"
committing torture,1 3 raping detainees,14 and raping or torturing minors.1 5 In
addition, she characterized CACI as a group of "hired killers" and "fricken
,,16
mercenaries.
Rhodes and Air America moved for summary judgment, and the district
court granted their motion, "concluding that Rhodes's statements were protected
by the First Amendment, either because they were not made with actual malice
or because they did not state actual facts about CACI. 17 Subsequently, CACI
appealed the summary judgment order to the Fourth Circuit.18 Several major
news outlets, including the New York Times, the Washington Post,
and the
19
Associated Press, filed a joint amici curiae brief supporting Rhodes.
Writing for the court, Judge Michael, joined in the opinion by Judge
Gregory, affirmed the district court's decision because CACI could not prove
that Rhodes made any of her statements with actual malice.2 ° Moreover, the
court agreed with the district court's finding that some of Rhodes's allegedly
defamatory statements were protected as "hyperbole" under the First
Amendment.21 Concurring in the judgment, Judge Duncan stressed that the court
based its decision not on "the defensibility of Rhodes's comments" but on the
high burdens put on public figures as plaintiffs and22 the high First Amendment
protections given to defendants in defamation cases.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19
280 (No.
20.
21.
22.

See id.at 288-92.
Id.
Id.at 292.
Id.at 288-92.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 298.
Id.at 299.
Id.at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 284.
Id. at 292.
Brief for Alm Media, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, CACI, 536 F.3d
06-2140), 2007 WL 1834262.
CACI, 536 F.3d at 304.
Id.
Id.at 304-05 (Duncan, J.,
concurring).
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While Virginia law lists several conditions under which a statement is per se
defamatory, 23 "[t]he 'application of the state law of defamation' is limited.., by
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." 24 The Fourth
Circuit held that the First Amendment protected all of Rhodes's statements at
issue in the case.25 In its analysis, the court separated Rhodes's statements into
three categories.
First, the court analyzed most of Rhodes's statements about CACI using the
actual malice standard.26 The watershed case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
first established this standard, which is now accepted as the standard
interpretation of First Amendment law in defamation cases involving public
figures.27 The court held that CACI constituted a public figure and assumed the
risk of "potentially exposing itself to the inhospitable climate of media criticism"
because of its role as a military contractor and its involvement with matters of
national security. 28 Moreover, CACI did not "contest its status as a public
figure. 29
Under the actual malice standard, plaintiffs who are public figures cannot
recover for defamation unless they can show that the defendant made the
statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not., 30 The question of whether a comment is reckless "'is not
measured by whether a reasonably prudent [person] would have published [or
spoken], or would have investigated before publishing [or speaking].' 31 Rather,
a plaintiff must show that "the defamatory statement
was 'made with [a] high
32
degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity."'
Regarding Rhodes's statements that CACI tortured detainees, raped
detainees, and raped or tortured children, the court examined several documents
on which Rhodes relied in making the remarks. These materials included a 60
Minutes II report 33 and an investigate journalist's article depicting the abuses

23. Id. at 292-93 (majority opinion) ("In Virginia a statement is defamatory per se if it,
among other circumstances, (1) 'impute[s] to a person the commission of some criminal offense
involving moral turpitude;' (2) 'impute[s] to a person unfitness to perform the duties of an office or
employment of profit, or want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such an office or
employment;' or (3) 'prejudice[s a] person in his or her profession or trade."' (alterations in
original) (quoting Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 82 S.E.2d 588, 591 (Va. 1954))).
24. Id. at 293 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990)).
25. Id. at 304.
26. Id. at 294.
27. See id. at 293 ("[A] public official or public figure cannot recover[] damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with 'actual malice'...." (second alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
28. Id. at 295.
29. Id.
30. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
31. CACI, 536 F.3d at 300 (alterations in original) (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
32. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)).
33. Id. at 284-85.
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occurring at Abu Ghraib. 34 In addition, the court reviewed two official United
States Army reports (the Taguba report and the Fay/Jones report) that were
commissioned after the abuses came to light and that confirmed CACI's
involvement in the detainee controversy.35 Furthermore, the court examined
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's and Senator Lindsey Graham's
comments respectively describing unpublished documents and photographs from
Abu Ghraib "as show[ing] . . . blatantly sadistic, cruel and inhumane" acts
against detainees and "contain[ing] scenes of rape and murder., 36 The court also
considered "an interview with Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, who was (at
the relevant time) in charge of U.S. detention facilities in Iraq," in which she
stated her belief that CACI "ordered these things [the abuses] to be done. 37
Finally, the court reviewed a 2004 law review article about military contractors38
and a New York Times Magazine "article about the large-scale use of military (or
security) contractors in Iraq." 39 The court examined each of these sources and
held that because Rhodes based her statements on these sources, she was not
speaking with reckless disregard for the truth.40
Second, the court found that some of Rhodes's obloquies did "not assert
actual facts about CACI., 41 The First Amendment provides "protection for
'rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet' and 'loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
language. ' '' 42 These protections are "necessary to 'provide[] assurance that
public debate will not suffer for lack of 'imaginative expression.' ' 43 The Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court that many of Rhodes's statements were
"'quintessential examples of non-actionable rhetorical hyperbole.,, 4 4 The district
court explained that Rhodes's comments "'make[] clear to all reasonable
listeners that [they] are offered . . . not as fact[s]' but as exaggerated rhetoric
intended
to spark the debate about the wisdom of the use of contractors in
45
Iraq."

34.

Id. at 286.

35. See id. at 285-87.
36. Id. at 287-88 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 288 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38.

Id. (discussing P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: PrivatizedMilitary

Firmsand InternationalLaw, 42 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521 (2004)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 303-04. The court also found the following:
[W]hen Rhodes speaks of 'these people' or 'guys' having fought on the side of
apartheid or Mobutu, she is referring to certain individuals currently employed by the
contractors, not the contractors themselves.... Rhodes did not accuse CACI in its
corporate capacity of fighting on behalf of apartheid or Mobutu.
Id. at 302.
41. Id. at 300.
42. Id. at 293 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17 (1990)).
43.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20).

44. Id. at 301 (quoting CACI Premier Tech. Inc. v. Rhodes, 35 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1300,
1316 (E.D. Va. 2006)).

45. Id. at 301-02 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting CACI, 35 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) at 1316).
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Third, the Fourth Circuit found that some of the statements were
"appropriately analyzed under both the actual malice standard and the standard
protecting statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts
about an individual or entity." 46 Those statements did not target CACI
specifically but military contractors in general.47 As the court further explained,
"[e]ven if we assumed that Rhodes in these statements was suggesting that CACI
was responsible for murder at Abu Ghraib, the statements would
be, as the
48
district court concluded, protected by the actual malice standard.
Quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the court concluded, "'[I]t is a
prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect
good taste, on all public [issues], and this opportunity is to49be afforded for
vigorous advocacy' that may be caustic and even exaggerated.,
Judge Duncan, concurring in the judgment, stressed her "view that the
appropriateness of summary judgment here is more reflective of the magnitude
of CACI's burden than the defensibility of Rhodes's comments."50 While the
accusations of child rape had, "at most, attenuated support,, 51 the law requires
that a plaintiff show in the pretrial stage that a defendant acted recklessly by
clear and convincing evidence.52 Judge Duncan concluded that "CACI's
involvement in other abuses at Abu Ghraib and the credible sources identifying a
contractor as the perpetrator of the child rape" contributed to the failure of its
claim.53
The Fourth Circuit's decision in CACI does little to modify the traditionally
far-reaching First Amendment protections given to statements about public
figures, which the Supreme Court first laid out in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. Instead, the Fourth Circuit simply applied this standard to uphold the
defendant's statements on a highly controversial issue. While the role of private
contractors in the United States' military engagements continues to change, the
"broad protection" that the First Amendment gives to even the most vociferous
critics of "public officials
or public figures responsible for war-related activities"
54
will assuredly persist.
Ian Duggan

46.
47.
48.
49.
254, 269
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 303.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 304 (second alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
(1964)).
Id.at 305 (Duncan, J.,
concurring).
Id.
Id.at 306.
Id.
Id.at 294 (majority opinion).
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